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INTRODUCTION
In the movie Minority Report, Tom Cruise’s character, Chief John
Anderton, runs a “Pre-Crime” unit operating out of Washington, D.C. in the
year 2054. Relying on three “Pre-Cogs” who can sense that a crime will be
committed, Chief Anderton is convinced that the Pre-Cogs are making the
nation safer—right up until the moment when the Pre-Cogs predict that
Anderton himself will be committing murder in the next thirty-six hours.
Anderton must find out why he’s been identified as a future murderer. The
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“minority report” referenced in the movie’s title is from the female Pre-Cog,
who occasionally dissents from the other two Pre-Cogs’ crime predictions. The
movie’s premise—what if we can predict the future risk of legal malpractice
using data generated by an unlikely source to fuel our predictions?—provides us
with a nice legal ethics question: What if we could pinpoint specific legal
malpractice markers before they mature into actual malpractice?2
The practice of law is evolving at a breathtaking pace—true even
before COVID-19, but especially true since the pandemic began. Big data,
advanced technologies, and alternative legal service providers are
revolutionizing how legal services are undertaken, delivered, priced, and
evaluated.3 Until recently, legal services have been almost entirely
We use the terms “malpractice,” “legal malpractice,” “legal professional liability,” and
“LPL” interchangeably as the same concept. We also use the terms “insurance company,”
“insurer,” and “carrier” interchangeably as the same concept.
3
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Fundamental Shift’ is Transforming the Delivery of Legal
Services, New Report Concludes, ABA J. (Jan. 6, 2020, 2:10 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/fundamental-shift-is-transforming-the-delivery-of-legal-services-report-concludes
[https://perma.cc/3378-XYC9] (discussing the effect of technology on legal practice);
Michele Gorman, Despite Hype, AI Still Hasn’t Caught on with Most Attorneys, LAW360
(Oct. 23, 2019, 7:38 PM), www.law360.com/articles/1212702/despite-hype-ai-still-hasn-tcaught-on-with-most-attorneys (noting that attorneys say that artificial intelligence and other
tools are “creating a generational shift” in legal service delivery); Aebra Coe, Data Science
No Longer a Luxury for Modern Law Practices, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:07 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/1105413/data-science-no-longer-a-luxury-for-modern-lawpractices (arguing that “lawyers will need to know the basics of data analytics and statistics”
to be competitive); Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., Leveraging Legal Analytics
and Spend Data as a Law Firm Self-Governance Tool, 13 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
171, 172–75 (2019) (discussing how firms are leveraging data to create a business
development advantage); Nancy B. Rapoport & Joseph R. Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics, Social
Science, and Legal Fees: Reimagining “Legal Spend” Decisions in an Evolving Industry, 35
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2019) [hereinafter Rapoport & Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics]
(discussing how data analytics tools are affecting legal service delivery); Aebra Coe, Why
More Law Firms Are Moving to the Cloud, LAW360 (Mar. 20, 2017, 3:33 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/903164/why-more-law-firms-are-moving-to-the-cloud (describing increased cloud usage at law firms); Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is
Transforming the Legal Profession, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:10 AM), https://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_pr
ofession [https://perma.cc/GPG7-QXER] (reporting that lawyers say artificial intelligence is
changing how they think, work, and interact with clients); John S. Dzienkowski, The Future
of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2995, 2995–96, 3017 (2014) (discussing the effect of innovative legal services models);
John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3041, 3041, 3056 (2014) (arguing that information technology has begun to disrupt lawyers’
market power in providing legal services); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal
Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven
Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 910–11, 949 (2013) (positing that legal
2
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consultative, qualitative, and tailored in nature. Statistics and automation
used to take a back seat to experience and human effort. In today’s legal
industry, there are two distinct offerings of “legal solutions”: (1) the practice
of law itself, and (2) the business of delivering legal services. 4 Clients now
receive a hybrid qualitative/quantitative service mix where many aspects of
law can be “mass customized,”5 using innovative artificial intelligence tools to
automate tasks formerly assigned to junior associates and paraprofessionals
and providing “bespoke” services on complex issues to those clients who can
afford them.6 Moreover, the increasing use of legal analytics provided by
third-party industry innovators can give both law firms and clients new
perspectives on efficiency and value.7
These innovations affect how, when, and where attorneys practice
(e.g., in BigLaw or elsewhere), thus contributing to heightened client
expectations regarding speed and accuracy in the delivery of legal

information technology will help define the future of the legal services industry). Most of these
changes are occurring in BigLaw or highly specialized boutiques, but many of the advances in
artificial intelligence are likely used by lawyers in the other sectors of legal practice as well, from
solos and small firms to mid-sized firms.
4
In other words, the pricing of those legal services, which also includes reductions in client bills
based on negotiations with clients and the overall budgeting process in which law firms engage.
5
“Mass customization” is defined as “the mass production of individually customized
products, goods, and services.” Mass Customization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mass%20customization [https://perma.cc/55YT-RNT6] (last
visited July 11, 2020). For one of the seminal articles on the application of mass
customization, see James H. Gilmore & B. Joseph Pine II, The Four Faces of Mass
Customization, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 91 (1997).
6
For a wonderful article discussing the array of legal services options available to a Chief
Legal Counsel, see Omari Scott Simmons, Chief Legal Officer 5.0, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
1741, 1747–49 (2020). Other great articles include Joan C. Williams, Aaron Platt & Jessica
Lee, Disruptive Innovation: New Models of Legal Practice, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2015);
McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 3; Dzienkowski, supra note 3.
7
Among the top disruptors, of course, is Legal Decoder. LEGAL DECODER
https://www.legaldecoder.com/ [https://perma.cc/6566-H2QZ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
(Yes, we’re both biased in favor of Legal Decoder.) Legal Decoder’s mission is to
revolutionize the way that legal services are priced and economically evaluated. Legal
Decoder’s software is capable of programmatically running the entire analysis of the
Malpractice Markers. See discussion infra Section IV.B. Other companies that provide data
about “legal spend” include LUMEN LEGAL, http://www.lumenlegal.com/legal-spendanalytics [https://perma.cc/VX7Q-KQ8B] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020); LegalVIEW
Analytics, WOLTERS KLUWER, https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/solutions/enterpriselegal-management/legalview-analytics) [https://perma.cc/BS5L-HSYF] (last visited Nov.
21, 2020); and BODHALA, (http://www.bodhala.com/legal-spend-analytics) [https://
perma.cc/Q9RW-JKJK] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
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services.8 Today, law is unabashedly a business in which clients expect
lawyers to deliver legal services better, faster, and cheaper, all without
sacrificing quality. The old days of having only two degrees of service
delivery freedom—fast and good, fast and cheap, slow and good—are gone. In
addition, clients have become ultra cost-conscious, often characterizing much of
the work performed by lawyers as routine, commoditized, and undeserving of
ever-increasing hourly rates. The practice of law is no longer a genteel profession
in which attorneys are viewed as skilled artisans, trusted advisors, and deep
thinkers, who can take all the time needed to deliver a (near-)perfect work
product. Feeling client pressure to be more efficient, legal professionals regularly
use innovative technologies in order to meet client expectations.9
When those expectations aren’t met, clients don’t hesitate to sue their
former attorneys for legal malpractice. For attorneys and malpractice
insurers, legal malpractice claims can result in massive economic damages,
resource drains, and reputational harm. Despite significant transformations in
nearly every other aspect of the legal industry, the approach to preventing,
predicting, assessing, and resolving malpractice claims hasn’t really changed.
Malpractice insurers and their law firm clients continue to take an oldfashioned approach when it comes to legal professional liability (LPL). LPL
industry experts have confirmed that most legal malpractice insurers aren’t
yet leveraging advancements in technology and legal analytics to predict risk
areas.10 Instead, LPL carriers primarily react to actual events or use the broad
brush of simple demographics to set rates. Consequently, the “all-in”
malpractice costs for insurers and law firms continue to escalate, even though

8

For a discussion of how chief legal officers can leverage new developments to keep legal
fees reasonable, see generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Using General Counsel to Set the Tone
for Work in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727 (2020); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Client-Focused Management of Expectations for Legal Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 28
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 39 (2020).
9
These innovative technologies include contract generation and review software; legal
analytics tools; practice management platforms; document management systems;
timekeeping and billing software; and eDiscovery tools, among others. For over two decades,
Robert Ambrogi, an attorney and journalist, has been writing about the LegalTech industry
on his website. LAWSITES, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/ [https://perma.cc/XD86-7LXD]
(last visited Nov. 6, 2020). That website is an excellent resource to keep abreast of
innovations in the LegalTech industry.
10
As part of our research for this article, we conducted hour-long interviews with over a
dozen executives directly involved in the LPL industry as LPL carrier executives,
underwriting experts, claims executives, LPL brokers and consultants, and risk management
partners at law firms. Special thanks go to David Bell, Steve Couch, Henry Dinger, Joe
McCarthy, Douglas Richmond, Todd C. Scott, and Sharon Stuart, along with a few other
interviewees who wished to remain anonymous.
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risk and costs should be decreasing. 11 This is the wrong result for everyone
directly or peripherally involved in the legal industry and, more specifically,
the wrong result for the LPL industry as a whole. 12
This paper posits that a data-driven approach to legal professional
liability will reduce the overall cost of malpractice claims, thus helping law
firms to recognize potential pressure points before those intimations of
problems become full-blown blisters. Part I analyzes the underpinnings of
malpractice claims. Part II discusses how malpractice insurers and their law
firm clients have historically assessed, underwritten, and resolved
malpractice claims. Part III explains why historical malpractice metrics fall
short. And Part IV proposes a new data-driven analytic schema by which
malpractice claims might be predicted, managed, assessed, and resolved.

11

To make matters worse for LPL carriers, many LPL industry experts indicated that the
underwriting profit margin for LPL carriers is razor-thin, often as low as five percent (5.0%),
leaving them with the challenge of having to rely predominantly on investment income to
generate their desired economic results. See supra note 10.
12
See, e.g., Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Claims Grow in Severity, Complexity,
Cost, INS. J. (May 31, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/05/
31/527978.htm [https://perma.cc/8K5V-VUDB] (discussing the growing complexity and
higher costs associated with defending legal malpractice claims); HERBERT M. KRITZER &
NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 71 (2018) (showing, in Figure 4.1, that the annual claim rate for large
firms is approximately 7.5 out of every 1,000 lawyers); id. at 121–22 (estimating that large firms
spend $570 million per year to pay and defend malpractice claims). As Kritzer and Vidmar note,
ALAS [Attorneys Liability Assurance Society] offers its members policies
with per-claim limits starting at $10 million and going as high as $75
million. Premiums are not experienced based. Rather, all members of
ALAS pay the same rate per lawyer for a policy with a specific limit and
a specific “self-insured retention” (SIR). A[ ] SIR operates similarly to a
deductible with one key difference. The insured must expend the SIR
before the insurer steps in and starts to pay; in a contract with a deductible,
the norm in the solo/small firm market, the insurer usually will recoup the
deductible from the insured after paying the claim and the defense costs.
The per-claim SIR with ALAS ranges from a minimum of $175,000 up to
a maximum of $5 million. In 2015, a policy with the lowest claim limit
had a premium of $5,075 per lawyer if the SIR was $175,000’ the premium
declined to $3,128 with a $1 million SIR and to $1,450 with a $5 million
SIR. The comparable figures for a policy with a claim limit of $50 million
were $9,398, $6,444, and $4,128, respectively; for a policy with the
maximum claim limit of $75 million, the figures were $10,664, $7,594,
and $5,225, respectively.
Id. at 45. See generally Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, https://alas.com
[https://perma.cc/EYZ5-FDMK] (last visited Nov. 27, 2020).
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I. UNDERPINNINGS OF MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
As with virtually every other aspect of the law, the basis for a legal
malpractice claim requires the application of law to a set of facts. We will
first discuss the types of errors and fact patterns giving rise to a legal
malpractice claim and then address how several theories of law determine
malpractice liability.
A. Legal Malpractice Errors
An infinite number of fact patterns could form the factual
underpinnings of a legal malpractice claim. We’ve distilled all of these fact
patterns into three types of errors indicating breaches of duties owed to clients
by their lawyers. First, there are substantive legal errors, such as giving
incorrect legal advice, doing exceptionally sloppy work (like missing a
statute of limitations or other important deadline), and engaging in other
actions that fall below the standard of care. Most substantive legal errors will
reflect on an attorney’s competence and diligence. Next, there are
administrative legal errors, which include failing to identify and resolve
conflicts of interest, faulty withdrawal from representation, failure to transfer
client files, and improper commingling of funds. Administrative errors
usually relate to poor workflow processes at law firms, insufficient client
communications, and ineffective internal controls and governance measures.
Worst of all are intentional wrongdoings, such as billing fraud,
misappropriation of client funds, frivolous litigation, and outright dishonesty,
all of which will trigger malpractice claims or worse.
B. Malpractice Theories of Liability
In countless cases and treatises, courts and legal experts have
explained the complicated principles of professional ethics and legal
professional liability, and we’re not going to rehash them here. 13 For purposes
of this article, we’ll offer a highly simplified and abbreviated version of the
elements of a legal malpractice action under several different legal theories.
Whether a claim is grounded in professional negligence, the law of
fiduciaries, or contract law, there are four fundamental elements required to
establish a prima facie malpractice action:14
13

For an in-depth discussion of the law of legal professional liability, see RONALD E.
MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2020 ed.), a five-volume, 9088-page treatise viewed as the
leading authority on the topic.
14
See, e.g., In re 35th & Morgan Dev. Corp., 510 B.R. 832, 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (“In
an action for legal malpractice the plaintiff must plead and prove that: the defendant attorney

274

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2020

•

Duty Owed. A lawyer-client relationship has been established, giving
rise to a legal duty owed by the lawyer to the client. 15 In nearly every
jurisdiction, the lawyer-client relationship triggering a lawyer’s duty
arises when a client seeks legal representation and advice or has formally
engaged counsel.16

•

Violation. Not every error made by a lawyer equates to malpractice.
There must be a violation of a standard of professional conduct that is
the baseline for acceptable professional behavior.

•

Causation. For a legal malpractice claim to be valid, an aggrieved client
must prove that the lawyer’s violation or error caused the damages. 17

•

Damages. An aggrieved client must prove actual damages. 18
1. Civil liability for professional negligence

Against this backdrop, it’s important to understand what does and
doesn’t “count” to establish a standard of care associated with civil liability
for professional negligence or legal malpractice. A state’s ethics rules provide
standards for professional discipline by the entity regulating lawyer
conduct.19 The violation of a state’s ethics rules can’t form the basis of a
owed the plaintiff a duty of due care arising from the attorney-client relationship; that the
defendant breached that duty; and that as a proximate result, the plaintiff suffered injury in
the form of actual damages. Even if negligence on the part of the attorney is established, no action
will lie against the attorney unless that negligence proximately caused damage to the client.”)
(quoting Governmental Interinsurance Exch. v. Judge, 850 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ill. 2006)).
15
1 MALLEN, supra note 13, § 8:12.
16
Id. Note that there are some ethical duties owed to potential clients. See MODEL RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Even when no client-lawyer relationship
ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal
that information . . . .”). Other duties flow to former clients. See, e.g., id. r. 1.9 (discussing
how lawyers and their present or former firms are constrained in using information about
former clients).
17
See 1 MALLEN, supra note 13, § 8:20 (“A basic tenet of any cause of action, no matter the
legal theory, is that the alleged wrongful conduct of the attorney must be a cause of the
plaintiff’s injury.”).
18
See 3 id. § 21:1 (“Although damages are an essential element of a cause of action for
legal malpractice, there are jurisdictional differences about whether nominal damages will
suffice. If actual damages are required, the courts agree that the fact of damage cannot be
left to speculation.”).
19
See, e.g., NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0A(c) (2019) (“Failure to comply with an
obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary
process.”); id. r. 1.0A(d) (“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action
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client’s malpractice action: State ethics rules only relate to the state’s own
ability to discipline those licensed to practice in the jurisdiction. A state’s
licensing authority can reprimand, suspend, or even disbar a lawyer who has
violated the ethics rules.20 Even though a violation of the state’s ethics rules
doesn’t give a plaintiff a free pass for winning a malpractice suit, a violation
of the ethics rules “may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of
conduct” as they provide industry accepted evidence of the standard of care.21
2. Breach of fiduciary duty22
Not only may a lawyer be disciplined for a violation of the ethics rules
or sued for negligence, but she may also be sued for a breach of her fiduciary
duty to her client. As CJS explains:
The relationship of client and attorney is one of trust,
binding an attorney to the utmost good faith in fair dealing
with the client and obligating the attorney to discharge that
trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and
fidelity. The nature of the relationship between attorney and
client is highly fiduciary as it consists of a very delicate,
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has
been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other
nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s selfassessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority,
does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to
seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct
by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable
standard of conduct.”) For a more general version of the ethics rules, see the guidance of the
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
20
See, e.g., Ethics FAQs, ST. BAR OF NEV., https://www.nvbar.org/member-services3895/ethics-discipline/ethics-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/9NHP-KMNU] (last visited Nov. 22,
2020) (listing forms of discipline that Nevada lawyers face for violating state ethics rules).
21
NEV. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0A(d) (2019); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl.
[20] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
22
Claims for breach of fiduciary duty closely resemble professional negligence claims, but
they differ when it comes to procedural requirements (e.g., statutes of limitations) as well as
available remedies. For instance, “[a] lawyer who has acted with reasonable care is not liable
in damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but other remedies such as disqualification,
restitution, and injunctive or declaratory relief may be available.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1998) (emphasis added). As a
result of the legal distinction between breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence,
our proposed “Malpractice Markers,” infra Section IV.C., likewise acknowledges the
distinction, separating out a unique “Fiduciary Risk” marker.
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exacting, and confidential character and requires the highest
degree of fidelity and good faith. The fiduciary duty of an
attorney extends both to current clients and former clients
and is broader in scope than a cause of action for legal
malpractice. Fiduciary duties created by an attorney-client
relationship may be breached even though the formal
representation has ended.23
In fulfilling a fiduciary duty to her client, an attorney “must serve the client’s
interests with the utmost loyalty and devotion.”24
As with malpractice cases, plaintiffs can’t link the violations of the
ethics rules directly to the violation of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties, but again,
the ethics rules “may evidence standards of care, and thus, the court may look to
the rules to determine whether an attorney failed to adhere to a particular
standard of care and thus breached . . . her fiduciary duty to a client.”25
3. Breach of contract
Add to all of these potential repercussions the garden-variety breach
of contract claim, which seeks a remedy for a failure to perform in accordance
with the client-lawyer engagement letter. For example, if the engagement
letter promises to let the client know of impending budget overruns and the
lawyer doesn’t do so, that’s a breach of contract.26 If the engagement letter
promises “best efforts,”27 then attorney sloppiness is a breach as well. Our
brief survey of the potential consequences for bad lawyer behavior gives you
a feel for how that misbehavior can lead to devastating consequences, not just
for the lawyer, but also for her law firm. 28
23

7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 344 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
Id.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Sample Engagement Letters, S.C. B., www.scbar.org/media/filer_public
/d6/08/d6083090-d65d-4f6a-b64a-8b08ef359836/sample_engagement_letters_sample_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GG6C-K2X9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“We will advise you if fees will
be significantly higher than this estimate. At such time, you may decide to restrict the scope
of our efforts or we may make other adjustments.”).
27
See id. (“You will appreciate we can make no guarantee of a successful conclusion in any
case. However, the attorneys of this firm will use their best efforts on your behalf.”).
28
For the quintessential tale of the consequences flowing to a major law firm for the failure
of one of its partners, see generally Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law
Firm That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98 (2007) (reviewing MILTON
C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)). Law
firms must supervise their attorneys (and their non-attorney staff); see, for example, MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1, 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). For an example of a lawsuit
encompassing, among other things, malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary
duty, see Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawsuit Accuses Morrison & Foerster of a ‘Billing Feeding
24

Vol. 6:2]

Using Data Analytics

277

II. BIG DATA AND STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. Overview
For decades, the insurance industry has run on internal data generated
from customer application forms, claims data, emails, and internal notes. 29
Insurers are now mining externally commissioned data from third-party
research organizations and are finding a treasure trove of information from
the public record (bankruptcies, judgments, foreclosures, and criminal
records) and even from social media sources in order to generate new
underwriting metrics.30 Without question, unstructured raw data abounds. A
daily challenge for insurers is transforming raw data into structured data and,
ultimately, into viable business intelligence.
One can add to the volume and variety of primary data that are
actively sought by insurers even more data that are being passively captured
via telematics,31 monitoring equipment, and other technological applications;
indeed, the possibilities for data usage in the insurance industry seem endless.
In most lines of coverage, insurers have been leveraging data to better
understand consumer behavior, to anticipate preferences and risks, to
expedite the application process, to improve claims management and

Frenzy,’ A.B.A. J. (Feb. 20, 2019, 12:05 PM), www.abajournal.com/news/article/suitaccuses-morrison-foerster-of-a-billing-feeding-frenzy [https://perma.cc/24M4-59VL].
29
Ins. Nexus, External Data in Insurance – Part 1, REUTERS EVENTS: INS., https://www.
reutersevents.com/insurance/analytics/external-data-insurance-part-1 [https://perma.cc/VP2R5Z9S] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
30
See, e.g., Herb Weisbaum, Data Mining Is Now Used to Set Insurance Rates; Critics Cry
Foul, CNBC (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/16/data-mining-is-nowused-to-set-insurance-rates-critics-cry-fowl.html [https://perma.cc/26QC-WNG4] (describing
“price optimization,” which is the insurance industry’s practice of using customer data to
raise rates for individuals likely to accept a rate increase but not for those who are more likely
to shop around than to pay a higher rate).
31
The term
[t]elematics refers to the use of wireless devices and “black box”
technologies to transmit data in real time back to an organization.
Typically, it’s used in the context of automobiles, whereby installed or
after-factory boxes collect and transmit data on vehicle use, maintenance
requirements or automotive servicing. Telematics can also provide realtime information on air bag deployments or car crashes and locate stolen
vehicles by using GPS technology. In addition, telematics can serve as the
platform for usage-based insurance, pay-per-use insurance, pay as you
drive (PAYD) insurance, pay how you drive (PHYD) programs for fleet
insurance, or teen driving programs for retail business.
Telematics, GARTNER: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GLOSSARY, https://www.gartner.com/
en/information-technology/glossary/telematics [https://perma.cc/6APQ-VJPH] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2020).
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“market[] effectiveness by tailoring products to individual preferences,” 32
and to reduce claims leakage, which is the difference between what a carrier
should have spent on a claim if that claim had been managed efficiently and
what the carrier actually spent resolving the claim. 33
“Big data” provides insurers with invaluable insights into all facets of
their business operations. From an operational perspective, data are helping
insurers identify trends, anomalies, competitive edges, and business
challenges so that insurance executives can craft strategic plans and implement
cutting-edge operational tactics for their organizations.34 In many coverage
lines, insurers have leveraged big data in their underwriting operations to more
accurately price and incentivize risk-reducing behaviors. For example, insurers
calculate smoker vs. non-smoker rates for health and life insurance, offer “safe
driver” discounts for auto insurance premiums, and reduce homeowner’s
insurance premiums for residences with a connected home security system.35
As a result of its commitment to data, the insurance industry benefits from
improved profitability via more accurately assessed risk.36
The big data trend shows no signs of slowing in the insurance
industry. The insurance industry spent roughly $2.4 billion annually on
gathering and using big data in 2018, and that amount is expected to

Big Data, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RSCH. (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_big_data.htm [https://perma.cc/N7KW-9WYX].
33
VIJAI GANESH, INFOSYS, BIG DATA ANALYTICS: IT’S TRANSFORMATIONAL IMPACT ON THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2 (2018), www.infosys.com/industries/insurance/white-papers/doc
uments/big-data-analytics.pdf [https://perma.cc/M38E-FWZ5].
34
Christopher Henry, How Big Data Is Changing the Insurance Industry, MEDIUM (Mar. 12,
2020), https://medium.com/@chrishtopher.henry_38679/how-big-data-is-changing-the-insur
ance-industry-293bb243a820 [https://perma.cc/UT4M-3V9Z].
35
Barbara Marquand, Life Insurance for Smokers vs. Quitters: When Are You a Nonsmoker?,
NERDWALLET (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/life-insurancenonsmoker/ [https://perma.cc/92U3-NPTF]; Paul Stenquist, Letting Your Insurer Ride
Shotgun, for a Discounted Rate, N.Y. TIMES, (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
07/16/business/car-insurance-app-discounts.html [https://perma.cc/T9R6-NT3K]; Insurance
Discounts for Using Alarm Systems to Protect Your Home, SAFETY.COM (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.safety.com/insurance-discounts-for-using-alarm-systems-to-protect-your-home/
[https://perma.cc/9DFU-KR6A].
36
As our friend Bernie Burk put it,
In the ordinary course of competition . . . that ought to translate to a very
significant degree to lower rates for lower-risk insureds. And . . . better
understanding in the legal industry can lead to better risk management, in
the sense of policies and practices that should tend to reduce the number,
severity, and cost of claims. How much of those savings end up in the
insurers’ pockets vs. the insureds’ pockets is one of those things [that]
economists debate long after everyone else has dozed off.
Comment from Bernard A. Burk, Consultant, to authors on an earlier draft of this
article (Sept. 28, 2020) (on file with authors).
32
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skyrocket to $3.6 billion by next year. 37 For anyone doubting the effect of big
data on the insurance industry, the emergence of an entire vertical segment in
the information technology industry called “InsurTech” affirms that
innovative technologies, particularly data analytics tools, will be a
cornerstone of the insurance industry for years to come. 38 The appetite for
data in the insurance industry is insatiable.
B. Amplifying Demographic Data with Behavioral Data
Policy holder segmentation is one of the most fundamental practices
in the insurance underwriting world. It enables insurers to accurately and
cost-effectively gauge an insured’s risk profile. 39 Until just recently,
segmentation methodologies used by insurance underwriters have focused on
demographic factors (age, gender, marital status, income, geography, and so
forth) as the stalwart metrics guiding the evaluation of underwriting risk. 40
Demographic data was the best (and only) way for insurers to establish a risk
profile. But as most insurers will attest, it is not uncommon for insureds who
have identical demographic criteria to behave in a radically different manner.
Such behavioral differences do not invalidate the use of demographics for
underwriting purposes. Demographics are an excellent starting point. But the
limitations, variables, and unpredictability inherently associated with relying
solely on demographics have underscored the need for insurers to find a more
sophisticated solution, using underwriting factors tailored to specific current
and potential policyholders. Today, underwriting experts understand the
limitations of demographic segmentation and seek best-in-class solutions.
Enter behavioral data.41 Behavioral data are data generated by, or in
response to, an individual’s activities, reactions, preferences, and habits. 42 By
uncovering how individuals act and why, behavioral data enables insurers to
predict more accurately how their policyholders are likely to act in the future
and to assess the risks posed by those behaviors. Sources of behavioral data
37

Big Data, supra note 32.
This is InsurTech’s Moment. Will Insurers Seize the Opportunity?, PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financial-services/library/insurtech-innovation.html
[https://perma.cc/85XT-LAQS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
39
DELOITTE, ADVANCED ANALYTICS AND THE ART OF UNDERWRITING: TRANSFORMING THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 4 (2007), www.the-digital-insurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
326-Deloitte_FSI_AdvancedAnalytics.pdf [https://perma.cc/9984-BVS2].
40
MARK CARR, SOUTH STREET STRATEGY GROUP & AMY MODINI, CHADWICK MARTIN BAILEY,
A NEW APPROACH TO SEGMENTATION FOR THE CHANGING INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2 (2012),
https://www.cmbinfo.com/cmb-cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/HealthDoc_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GEE6-CGVW].
41
ERIC BENJAMIN SEUFERT, FREEMIUM ECONOMICS: LEVERAGING ANALYTICS AND USER
SEGMENTATION TO DRIVE REVENUE 47–82 (Andrea Dierna ed., 2014).
42
Shane Greenstein, Behind the Buzz of Behavioral Data, 35 IEEE MICRO 88, 88 (2015).
38
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include websites, mobile devices, software systems, marketing automation
systems, medical equipment, call centers, help desks, and billing systems.
Behavioral data can be generated from individuals, businesses, or individuals
within a business, but behavioral data can always be tied back to a single enduser and is typically captured as an “event.” For underwriting purposes,
insurers now supplement historical, internal demographic data with
behavioral data from external, technologically enabled data sources.
Behavioral data can be used to generate better coverage solutions because
insurers have better predictive insights into the relative risk of underwriting
an individual policy in the future policy term. Many lines of coverage already
are capturing and leveraging behavior data in ways never before imagined.
C. The Auto Insurance Paradigm – Behavioral Data Comes to the Forefront
To acquaint readers with a close analog for how behavioral data,
fueled by innovative technology, could be used in the legal malpractice
context, let’s examine the underwriting process for automobile insurance and
how it’s evolved. It used to be that automobile insurance and the related
premiums were largely based on simple factors.43 Historically, the
information used by auto insurers to gauge underwriting risk included only
the application information, driver demographics, driver history, and vehicle
history.44 This information was fed into the insurer’s rating system to produce
an underwriting rating or score, and then the insurance company would use
those variables to determine insurability and the size of the premium.45
Even as we have moved into the big data era, the information
embodying “legacy” auto insurance underwriting factors surely remains
relevant; however, innovative technologies, like telematics, 46 that surface
behavioral trends have revolutionized the underwriting criteria for auto

Cf. Josh Anish, 11 Things Car Insurance Companies Don’t Want You to Know,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2019, 1:42 PM), www.marketwatch.com/story/11-things-carinsurance-companies-dont-want-you-to-know-2019-10-29 [https://perma.cc/4DXZ-GB3M]
(demonstrating that legacy driver-based criteria have expanded to include prior claims, credit
score, marital status, job status, and education level).
44
Insurance Experts Explain the Main Demographic Factors That Influence Car Insurance
Rates, BUS. INSIDER: MKTS. INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://markets.
businessinsider.com/news/stocks/insurance-experts-explain-the-main-demographic-factorsthat-influence-car-insurance-rates-1027738423 [https://perma.cc/PH48-YQW3]; Insider
Information: How Insurance Companies Measure Risk, INSURANCECOMPANIES.COM,
https://www.insurancecompanies.com/insider-information-how-insurance-companies-measurerisk/ [https://perma.cc/L8KU-6TZP] (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
45
Insurance Experts Explain, supra note 44.
46
See Big Data, supra note 32 (discussing the use of telematics).
43
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insurance.47 For the past decade or so, our vehicles have been running on a
plethora of advanced sensors and other data-collecting and data-transmitting
technologies that allow for real-time communications and data sharing.
Advanced technologies have transformed what used to be a moving bucket
of bolts into a data sponge. These new telematic technologies monitor and
report on an automobile’s mechanical performance, augmenting significantly
the “vehicle history” part of the underwriting equation.48 More important for
purposes of auto insurance underwriting, premiums, and claims, these
technologies also monitor driver behavior, driving patterns, and automobile
usage trends.49 Sensors capture a car’s speed, brake application, airbag
deployment, seatbelt use, steering angles, A/V usage, and similar factors.50 The
captured data is not just limited to vehicle performance but includes personal
information, too, such as driver weight, music tastes, and places visited,
including fast-food drive-throughs.51 Rather than relying solely on
demographic data (application forms and driving history), insurers can
leverage behavioral data by “watching” a driver operate a vehicle for a little bit
and determining an underwriting score based upon the driver’s actual driving
history.52 Then, in a more fulsome underwriting exercise, insurers can take a
single driver’s metrics and compare an individual’s driving behavior with a
larger pool of data to correlate behavior and risk. Newfangled underwriting

See, e.g., Stenquist, supra note 35 (describing telematics as “like the Elf on the Shelf, but
for car insurance. Call it the mole on the console.”).
48
How Telematics May Help You Save Money on Car Insurance, ALLSTATE (last updated Aug.
2020), https://www.allstate.com/tr/car-insurance/telematics-device.aspx [https://perma.cc/
KSA8-U3BZ]; How Does Telematics Work?, VERIZON CONNECT (last updated Oct. 29,
2019), https://www.verizonconnect.com/resources/article/what-is-telematics/ [https://perma.cc/
P9NV-HRJU].
49
How Telematics May Help You, supra note 48.
50
Stenquist, supra note 35; How Does Telematics Work?, supra note 48.
51
Geoffrey A. Fowler, What Does Your Car Know About You? We Hacked a Chevy to Find
Out, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/
12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/
J3AA-56D3]; Stephanie Voelker, Debunking the Top 10 Vehicle Tracking Myths, GEOTAB
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.geotab.com/blog/top-myths-misconceptions-related-to-telematics/
[https://perma-cc/M8MT-LH84]. A car can generate 20 to 200 gigabytes a day, according to
some estimates. The data trove in the hands of car makers could be worth as much as $750
billion by 2030, the consulting firm McKinsey has estimated. But consumer groups,
aftermarket repair shops and privacy advocates say the data belongs to the car’s owners and
the information should be subject to data privacy laws. Stephen Gossett, IoT in Vehicles: A
Brief Overview, BUILT IN (Dec. 13, 2019), builtin.com/internet-things/iot-in-vehicles
[https://perma.cc/H7TQ-R3FJ].
52
Snapshot Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE (last updated July 21, 2020),
www.progressive.com/support/legal/snapshot-privacy-statement/ [https://perma.cc/7UPF8EEF]; Privacy Policy, ROOT INS. (last updated Apr. 1, 2020), www.joinroot.com/privacypolicy [https://perma.cc/QZ24-7ZQZ].
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scores emanating out of driving behavior, mileage, and other metrics are
realities in this highly innovative arena.53
In the context of auto insurance, insurers have augmented and
improved the “old school” approach with new technologies that unearth
behavioral trends. It stands to reason that it is only a matter of time before the
insurance industry implements the “connected car” paradigm across all lines
of business. Like the auto insurance line of coverage, underwriting metrics
are becoming significantly more individualized, sophisticated, and datadriven in property and casualty insurance, health insurance, and life
insurance, among others. We think that LPL coverage is a prime area for
mimicking the approach seen in auto insurance underwriting, but the LPL
area is sorely lagging behind underwriting advances in other insurance lines.
We don’t just think that it’s a good business idea to bring LPL into the modern
era; we think that it’s vital to the survival of the LPL industry and its lawyercustomers. In the next sections, we trace the current state of play in the legal
malpractice underwriting scene and explain how smart data analytics tools
can drive better LPL underwriting metrics by individualizing an attorney’s
malpractice risk profile.
D. Data Usage in the LPL Segment
Iris: Sometimes in order to see the light, you
have to risk the dark.
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)54
Given that the insurance industry uses ultra-sophisticated data
analytics to inform most of its business lines, it boggles our minds that industry
hasn’t brought a sophisticated level of behavioral data analysis into the mix to
illuminate the legal malpractice line of business. We’re not willing to go so far
as to say that legal malpractice underwriting metrics are stuck entirely in the
53

In the vehicle insurance context, driving-related data captured via telematics is far from
perfect but far better than nothing. For instance, a driver with a lead foot may not excessively
exceed the speed limit during the week because she may live in a congested metropolitan
area with a ton of traffic and never has a chance to drive fast during weekday rush hour like
she does on weekends. A smoothing effect may blur her weekend speeding habit. Likewise,
telematics cannot meaningfully account for the senior partner who stops at the club for a
drink or two after work before heading home but, miraculously, never had his inexcusable
behavior behind the wheel of a car detected (yet . . . ) by telematic means. Without question,
the partner’s behavior, in additional to being illegal, surely results in greater risk of motor
vehicle collisions but could remain largely undetected. So, data analytics in the insurance
realm is not a 100% accurate silver bullet, but it surely goes a long way to point insurers in
the right direction when it comes to gauging underwriting risk posed by its insured.
54
MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
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dark ages or that the legacy demographic metrics can’t shed some light on legal
malpractice risk, but the approach that LPL underwriters are using today is akin
to the underwriting approach in auto insurance lines from the late 1900s. Much
like in the auto insurance context, the “real” underwriting risk is mostly
derived from behavioral data, not demographic data.
Indeed, the metrics used to calculate legal malpractice underwriting
risk, assess claims exposure, and settle LPL claims seem shockingly
unsophisticated. Fewer than a dozen factors are considered, and that paucity
of data affords legal malpractice insurance little more than a perfunctory
evaluation of risk.55 For insurers, the baseline for evaluating a law firm’s
underwriting risk starts with an application that captures primarily, if not
exclusively, demographic data. 56 The LPL application57 captures little to no
meaningful behavioral data, and in the big-data age, that gap strikes us as
woefully inadequate.
None of the factors used to evaluate legal malpractice risk is per se
wrong, and all of them should continue to be used. But as we discuss below,
these factors have inherent predictive limitations, allowing for only broad
conjecture. Indeed, this demographic data is a poor proxy for behavioral data,
borne of guesswork and presumptions about behavioral patterns. We discuss
below the demographic data being used by LPL insurers and why we think
that such data have limited predictive value.
1. Practice area
As we studied how LPL insurers envisage risk factors, we discovered
that they maintain a fairly consistent categorization of areas of practice that
tend to produce the most claims. The riskiest practice areas are mergers and
acquisitions, trusts and estates, tax opinions, patent law, securities, plaintiffside medical malpractice, environmental law, and real estate. 58 The industry
55

Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J.
LEGAL PRO. 41, 58–59 (2004).
56
NANCY R. KORNEGAY & DAVID H. BROWN, PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE 3 (2011), http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/10357/137641_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2UA-DF9F].
57
Per our interviews, LPL industry experts have said that the typical application can be as
little as five pages or as much as forty pages long. Several of them also indicated that LPL
carriers struggle with striking a balance between wanting to know everything in the LPL
application and causing applicants to want to walk away because of too many questions.
58
Based on interviews; see supra note 10. See also MAGGIE WELK, KIMBERLE WILLIAMS &
CRAIG GREUEL, ARGONAUT INS. CO., ARGO PRO PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SERFF FILING 3
(2017) (SERFF Tracking Number ARGN-130932892) (explaining that Argo’s insurance
rates for attorneys are based in part on an “Area of Practice Factor” that can increase rates
based on the frequency and severity of claims generally arising out of that practice area);
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clearly views the type of practice area as relevant to legal malpractice risk,
particularly when claims are predicated on substantive errors.59 At first blush,
one might be inclined to conclude that the “riskiest” areas of law are the most
sophisticated, most complicated, and most prone to misapprehension of the
law. This conclusion, though aspirational, simply is not true.
A lawyer’s natural hope is that LPL insurers look, in proper context,
to the competence and behavior of an insured attorney when evaluating her
legal malpractice risk profile. 60 They want legal malpractice risks and
premiums to be based on actual competence and specifically observed
behaviors, not on behavioral risk that is inferred from generalized
information with no inherent predictive value. In reality, the degree of LPL
risk ascribed to “high-risk” practice areas has little to do with legal
complexity or professional competence required by a discipline of law.
Indeed, risk ascribed to a practice area is based upon the industry-wide
number of claims made in that area of law and the severity of those claims.
There are certain fields of law where clients have proven to be more inclined
to make a malpractice claim and seek comparatively higher damages than in
other practice areas.61
News Release, Ames & Gough, Rising U.S. Legal Malpractice Claims Continue to Plague
Law Firms (May 20, 2020), https://www.amesgough.com/sites/default/files/A%26G%20
News%20Release%20-%202020%20LPLI%20Claims%20Survey%20-%205-20-20.pdf
[https://perma-cc/AQ2U-SDBQ] (describing that, based on a survey of lawyers’ professional
liability claims, business transactions and corporate and securities were the two practice areas
experiencing the largest number of legal malpractice claims in 2019).
59
According to several LPL industry experts, the risk profile of “boutique” law firms that
specialize in a single area of practice is considerably lower than the risk profile for general
practice law firms. When different attorneys in a single law firm practice in multiple areas
of law, LPL carriers typically evaluate each “pocket” of practice area practitioners during
the underwriting process. They are asking whether those practice groups represent a high
combined level of expertise or are comprised of “dabblers” who are new entrants into the
particular practice area. Similarly, a lawyer with a broad breadth of practice areas might be
a prototypical “small town lawyer” or a dabbler looking for a more remunerative practice
area. LPL carriers are now also grappling with the complicated issue of how to assign risk to
attorneys who engage in a multi-jurisdictional practice.
60
Almost universally, the LPL industry experts shared the view that their lawyer-insureds
have only a superficial understanding of the LPL evaluation process.
61
Top Practice Areas for Lawyers’ Malpractice Claims, INS. J. (June 28, 2018)
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/06/28/493458.htm [https://perma.cc/
V3DJ-YG67]. As an example of severity of claims in a “high risk” area of law, consider the
purchase and sale of a warehouse. Recording a deed of transfer or mortgage on the land
records is far from complex. However, if a mistake is made during recording, that mistake
more often than not jeopardizes the entire value sought by a client buying or selling the
property and it’s not a mistake easily overlooked by the client given the magnitude of the
harm. The substantive error did not materialize because of legal complexity. However, it did
trigger a claim mainly because the error completely subverted a client’s objective and the
resultant harm was catastrophic.
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Additionally, the “area of law” factor assumes that attorneys always
stay in their lane, practicing only within their area of expertise. That
assumption is flat-out wrong. Dabbling in an area of law that falls outside of
an attorney’s core competence gives rise to a significant number of claims
and can run afoul of a lawyer’s professional duties.62 According to the
American Bar Association’s “Profile of Legal Malpractice Claims: 2012–
2015,” over 60% of all malpractice claims pertain to a practice area in which
the accused attorney works for less than 20% of his or her time.63 To put a
finer point on matters, only about 7% of all legal malpractice claims are made
against attorneys who practice in a single area of the law.64 When attorneys
dabble in non-core areas of law, the behavioral tendencies of those dabblers
will skew underwriting data—to the detriment of attorneys who do stay in
their lane as a specialized practitioner and to the detriment of those LPL
insurers who insure them. Moreover, using the area of law as a factor is less
meaningful when the legal malpractice results not from substantive errors but
from administrative errors or intentionally wrongful behavior. 65 Those two
categories account for one third of all malpractice claims.66
2. Firm size
Unlike other professions, whose annual malpractice premiums are
determined based on the firm’s annual revenue, malpractice premiums for
law firms are calculated on a per-lawyer basis and depend on the number of
attorneys in the firm.67 There is some variation among insurers, but typically
law firms are segmented into anywhere between five and nine size
categories.68 Some LPL carriers even evaluate the lawyer-to-support staff

American Bar Association Rules and every state impose a duty that “a lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
63
William F. McDevitt, Dabbling: A Dangerous Practice Even for Accomplished Attorneys,
LAW.COM (June 9, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/120
2759657347/?slreturn=20201011113526 [https://perma.cc/BR6R-Z7Y7].
64
Id.
65
ABA STANDING COMM’N ON LAWYERS’ PRO. LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL PRACTICE CLAIMS
2012–2015, at 18 (2016) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM’N].
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., WELK ET AL., supra note 58, at 1 (making the point that Argo’s insurance rates
for attorneys are based in part on the “Size of Firm Factor”).
68
See, e.g., ARCH INS. CO., LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY PROGRAM: GENERAL
RATING RULES 4, 6 (2014) (segmenting firms into one of nine size categories); LAWGOLD,
RATING GUIDELINES LAWGOLD LPL (ARIZONA) 4 (2010) (segmenting firms into one of six
size categories).
62
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ratio in an attempt to gain further insights into a firm’s risk profile. 69 Solo
practitioners and small firms (up to ten attorneys) account for over 75% of
malpractice claims and thus pay the highest premiums per capita. 70 LPL
insurers infer certain law firm and attorney behaviors based on law firm size.
For instance, the LPL carrier metrics assume that larger law firms with more
resources have better internal risk management controls 71 and more reliable
administrative procedures than do smaller firms. 72 LPL insurers also assume
that larger law firms will have attorneys whose expertise covers a sweeping
range of practice areas, thereby reducing the instances of lawyers dabbling
outside their core practice areas.73 LPL insurers further assume that the
behaviors of the overwhelming majority of lawyers in an Am Law 400 law
firm risk mimic each other or, at least, do not vary significantly. Moreover,
LPL insurers assume that larger firms are less risky because fewer claims are
made against them than are made against smaller firms. In the eyes of the
actuaries at LPL insurers, these size-based assumptions and the concomitant
inferences about lawyer behavior are “true enough” to rely on firm size as an
underwriting metric.74
The assumptions may be correct or mostly correct, but they also have
their limitations because the assumption that larger organizations pose a
lower risk profile is far from unassailable. Certainly, larger law firms have
the resources to implement greater risk controls, but firm politics and
economics—and organizational bureaucracy—can undermine even the best
risk mitigation initiatives. The “competence of large numbers” assumption
also seems to be misguided. With throngs of people working on a high
volume of matters and lots of task handoffs from professional to professional,
mistakes inevitably happen. Indeed, it is just as possible that having more
69

Per our interviews, the LPL experts indicated that a well-trained support staff is viewed
positively in the LPL underwriting process (presumably because of their ability to curtail
administrative risk) until the attorney-to-support staff ratio crosses a certain threshold, at
which point LPL carriers presume that excessive support staff personnel are poorly trained
and/or inadequately supervised.
70
ABA STANDING COMM’N, supra note 65, at 14.
71
In reading an earlier draft, Nancy’s friend Randy Gordon pointed out that risk management
can, itself, create risk. As Randy explains, “every risk management form that is supposed to
get filled out and/or signed by the client is evidence of malpractice when it doesn’t get filled
out or returned.” E-mail from Randy Gordon, Partner, Barnes & Thornburg, to Nancy B.
Rapoport, (Sept. 7, 2020, 6:52 PM) (on file with authors).
72
Randy Gordon also observed that the compensation systems in large law firms can cause
“sometimes perverse incentives.” Id. We agree wholeheartedly, and one of our future studies
will compare the behavior in firms that use lockstep partner compensation with the behavior
in firms that use an “eat what you kill” compensation system.
73
As Bernie Burk reminded us, even BigLaw lawyers can dabble. They just have more
people at the firm to help them think through issues that “dabblers” might face. Comment
from Bernie Burk, supra note 36.
74
Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10.
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people in the equation creates a greater risk of malpractice errors rather than
acting as a check and balance against malpractice.75 The resources of larger
law firms allow them to tamp down or mute problems so that they don’t
register on the radar screens of LPL insurers (or, more specifically, the
insurers’ actuaries). Finally, many solo practitioners are uninsured, which
could mean that those solo practitioners who pose no malpractice risk are not
counted in the actuarial analysis.76 Simply put, the assumptions underlying
the “size of firm” factor as an underwriting metric may not be as
determinative as LPL insurers have assumed.
3. Geography
The state in which a law firm practices, as well as different locations
within the state, contributes to a firm’s malpractice risk profile.77 Geography
per se is a red herring because the real factor measured is the hourly rate that
a firm charges for services rendered. Statistics show that firms that charge
higher rates (usually in metro areas) typically see claims with a higher dollar
value, but this correlation doesn’t pertain to the frequency of claims made or
the underlying basis for the claim. 78 In other words, LPL insurers are not
focusing on the error/violation or causation elements of a malpractice claim
but instead are focusing on the damages element. 79 We sympathize, because
damages affect the magnitude of the payouts, but preventing the malpractice
in the first place will also affect the magnitude of the payout. We see little, if
75

It makes logical sense that more professionals in a law firm handling more matters
increases the risk of something going wrong. With ethical rules imposing a duty of
supervision and vicarious liability on law firm partners for the misdeeds and professional
malpractice of colleagues, legal malpractice underwriters for larger law firms are keen to
know how throngs of associates are supervised and whether a management committee or
peer-review system exist. These types of management control measures are a baby step in
the right direction towards the use of behavioral, not just demographic, data.
76
See Scott R. Schaffer & Kyle P. Barrett, Bare Naked Lawyers: Practicing Without LPL
Insurance May Leave Attorneys Overexposed, AON ATTORNEYS ADVANTAGE, https://
www.attorneys-advantage.com/Risk-Management/Bare-Naked-Lawyers [https://perma.cc/
R6FJ-E9TS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (stating that, for example, “a 2005 Texas survey
found that . . . 63% of solo practitioners were uninsured”); Susan Humiston, Practicing Law
Without Liability Insurance, MINN. ST. B. ASS’N: BENCH & B. MINN. https://
www.mnbar.org/resources/publications/bench-bar/columns/2019/10/02/practicing-law-with
out-liability-insurance [https://perma.cc/95B6-T6DJ] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Illinois
estimates that as many as 40 percent of solo lawyers are uninsured. In a 2017 survey in
Washington, 28 percent of solo practitioners reported being uninsured.”).
77
See, e.g., WELK ET AL., supra note 58 (stating that professional liability insurance rates
will vary based on state).
78
Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10.
79
An attorney practicing in Dallas, Texas is going to pay more than an attorney practicing in
rural Nebraska. Some states, like New York, have multiple underwriting territories, with law
firms in New York City paying more than attorneys in upstate New York.
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any, correlation between geography and those behaviors that are likely to
trigger a legal malpractice claim.
4. Claims history/step rating
“Claims made”80 history is widely viewed as the most accurate
predictor of future claims. 81 Although claims history has undertones of
behavioral data, it is almost entirely a quantitative criterion using, in most
instances, a multivariate analysis. Typically, a “claim” will include any event
reported to any insurance company with an incurred loss amount of $5,001
or more.82 Claims history is segmented primarily by firm size,83 number of
claims over the past five years, 84 and total dollar amounts of all claims over
the past five years. 85 Each of these claims history factors is ascribed a value
An “occurrence” policy provides coverage for alleged incidents that occurred during the
policy year irrespective of when the claim is reported to the carrier. A “claims-made” policy
provides coverage for an incident that occurred during the policy period and was reported as
a claim when the policy was in effect. When a claims-made policy becomes effective, the
effective date, also known as the retroactive date, becomes a permanent part of the claimsmade policy and remains the same each year the policy is renewed. A claims-made policy,
when renewed, covers claims that come in during the policy year for incidents that occurred
on or after the retroactive date. This is how an attorney can be covered for prior acts or
incidents that are several years old.
81
Past and pending claims can affect not only the cost of a firm’s policy, but also eligibility
for coverage.
82
“Incurred amount” includes reserve and payment for indemnity and expenses. When a
claim has been reported but the claims reserve is unknown, five-twenty five percent of the
demand amount may be used as the best estimate for the claim value. See, e.g., ARCH INS.
CO., supra note 68, at 4 (“For purposes of the additional charge, a ‘claim(s)’ [sic] means:
any claim reported to any insurance company with an incurred loss amount of $5,001 or
more. Incurred amount includes reserve and payment for indemnity and expenses.”);
LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4 (“For the purposes of the adjustment, losses will only be
considered ‘claims’ if: i) loss and/or expense payments have been made in excess of $5,000;
or ii) an insurer has established a claim file and carries an open reserve in excess of $5,000.”).
83
See discussion supra note 68 and accompanying text.
84
See ARCH INS. CO., supra note 68, at 4; LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4. Certain LPL
insurers flatly deny coverage to firms with over five prior claims in the past five years.
85
See ARCH INS. CO. supra note 68, at 5; LAWGOLD, supra note 68, at 4. One insurer has
categorized claims liability into the following categories:
Severe Account has already experienced at least one loss with total case
reported losses (including defense expenses) exceeding deductible by
more than $100,000.
Significant There is a possibility of payout exceeding the deductible by
$10,000 but not by more than $100,000.
Material While there are established reserves for this account and payout
may exceed the deductible, it is not anticipated to exceed the deductible by
more than $10,000.
80
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that may increase or decrease an LPL carrier’s so-called base rate. For
example, a law firm that has had no claims made against it may receive a
“claim-free” credit that decreases the base rate. Conversely, a law firm that
has been the subject of many legal malpractice claims will see its base rate
increased by a multiple based on “claims made.” 86 A final quantitative
wrinkle that arises in the context of the claim history is the “step rating”
attributed to a lawyer. 87 A lawyer’s step rating recognizes that newly minted
attorneys generally have fewer clients and fewer prior acts, as compared to
more seasoned attorneys. This makes the “prior acts” risk concomitantly
lower.88 Typically, an insurance carrier that uses the “step rating”
methodology offers a reduced rate in the first five or six years of an LPL
policy, after which time the attorney malpractice profile has reached maturity,
ripening into the “typical” risk profile.89
A considerable amount of quantitative analysis goes into “claims
history,” but we think that “claims” are misrepresented when the insurer
relies solely on demographic data. First, there are unmade claims that could
have or should have been made based on actual attorney (mis)behavior, but
that were never counted because clients were unaware of the potential claim.90
Second, in circumstances in which a client has become aware of a potential
claim, many clients may choose not to pursue their claim against the law firm.
Third, in circumstances in which a client has become aware of a potential claim
and has opted to pursue it, the law firm and client may have agreed to resolve
Minimal There have either been no claims reported or claims reported
have had no payout or a low possibility of ultimate payout.
VIRGINIA PUTZU & TONIA BURLEIGH, QBA INSURANCE CORP., LAWYERGUARD SERFF
FILING Flex-8 (2018) (SERFF Tracking Number QBEC-131630592.)
86
Even a high number of claims might not mean a high risk of large payouts. One LPL
industry expert estimated that 75–80% of claims reported by lawyers to LPL carriers ended
up with no action by the aggrieved party.
87
In determining how to price the first year of coverage and succeeding renewals, the claimsmade insurers’ actuaries closely monitor statistical data reflecting the lag time between
occurrences which create liability and the reporting of claims arising out of those
occurrences. In addition, they study the impact of various economic factors on the value of
claims during this lag time. From this data, they draw conclusions about the number of years
likely to elapse before all of the claims arising out of any one “occurrence year” are reported
and settled and the ultimate cost of defending and settling those claims. Then, they use these
conclusions to establish rating factors to determine the cost of a claims-made policy as it
renews each year. These rating factors are commonly referred to as “step rates” because they
evolve in a stair-step pattern. See, e.g., How Legal Malpractice Insurance is Priced, OKLA.
ATT’YS MUTUAL INS. CO., https://oamic.com/step-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/NCQ9-LCGN]
(last visited June 17, 2020) (discussing what step ratings are and how they work).
88
On the other hand, the risk of a newer lawyer actually committing malpractice is likely to
be higher. We both made many mistakes at the beginning of our careers.
89
Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10.
90
See supra note 82 (noting that it might not be immediately apparent that there is enough
value to make a claim due to the concept of “incurred amount”).
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the claim without putting the LPL carrier on notice. Underreporting of claims
strikes us as a meaningful limitation on the factor’s accuracy.
Besides underreporting, claims history does not look to the underlying
behavior giving rise to the claim. Except for the damages calculation ascribed to
a claim, the actuarial methodology seems to treat all claims more or less
identically. That can’t be correct. By ignoring lawyer behavior, the merits
of a claim, and its factual underpinnings as part of claims history, LPL
insurers are using a blunt instrument to assess a complex problem when a
surgical tool that considers behavior in the context of claims history would
yield better risk assessments.
5. Client roster
A law firm’s client roster can create additional malpractice risk.
Clients that have unreasonable expectations for an attorney or for the
outcome of their matter are more likely to make a malpractice claim. Client
size and sophistication, as well as a client’s proclivity to challenge its law
firm’s bill, alters the risk profile. Similarly, the number of law firms that have
been previously employed by the client on the same matter is viewed as a high
indicator of risk. That factor, we believe, is reasonably accurate, though
sometimes the frequent switching of firms stems not from client dissatisfaction
at all, but rather from a client’s desire to keep her lawyer even after her lawyer
has changed firms. Lateral movement of attorneys from firm to firm is
commonplace today. It is not clear to us whether the firm turnover calculus
accounts for a client who follows the same lateral lawyer from firm to firm.
6. Miscellaneous considerations
Malpractice risk is viewed as being higher (or lower) as a result of the
absence (or presence) of loss-prevention programs, use of risk management
practices, docket control measures, conflict of interest avoidance policies,
and law-firm-imposed continuing legal education requirements.91 We agree
that a systems approach to managing risk is a necessary underpinning, but
having a good system in place is not the same thing as using that system. 92
Without question, LPL underwriters should continue to use the
quantitative/demographic factors discussed above as indicia of risk. These
factors are time-tested, and insurers will affirm that they have meaningful
91

Other factors not related to the risk posed by a lawyer or law firm that affect the cost of a
policy include policy limits, deductibles, self-retention obligations, and additional claim
defense expenses paid outside the policy limits.
92
One of us can’t resist pointing to the “gate fails” of FAIL Blog: CHEEZBURGER: FAIL
BLOG, https://cheezburger.com/4882611968/security-fail [https://perma.cc/BW7X-SGQ2]
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020). The other one of us is indulging her here.
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correlations to risk. That said, we’re in the age of big data and must therefore
ask: Are there other big-data-driven behavioral metrics that can better
pinpoint LPL risk and that can be used to augment or even outweigh the
legacy metrics? We think so.
III. WHY LEGAL MALPRACTICE METRICS NEED TO EVOLVE
Iris: It’s funny how all living organisms are
alike . . . when the chips are down, when the
pressure is on, every creature on the face of the
Earth is interested in one thing and one thing
only. Its own survival.
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)93
The prior two Parts paint a starkly contrasting picture between the
sophisticated risk assessment data and metrics used in auto insurance
underwriting and the rudimentary data and metrics used in LPL underwriting.
At the risk of stating the obvious,94 overlaying qualitative, behavioral data
into the underwriting mix has brought auto insurance underwriting into the
twenty-first century of big data. LPL insurance underwriting, on the other
hand, seems to be stuck in the twentieth century, with antiquated risk
assessments using only large-scale quantitative, demographic data. 95 For both
the LPL segment of the insurance industry and for the legal industry as a
whole, the use of unsophisticated underwriting metrics is a suboptimal
approach. There are significant business imperatives and competitive drivers
for both LPL insurers and law firms that should prompt legal malpractice
insurers to begin to incorporate behavioral data into underwriting guidelines.
Each segment has been given the mandate by clients to innovate and deliver
greater client value.96
In the insurance industry today, customers are the most disruptive
97
force. The leading insurers have found that their paramount mission must
93

MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
Which has never stopped us.
95
The specifics as to the operational and financial effect of using a combination of
demographic data and behavioral data across the entire industry as a whole extends well
beyond the scope of this article.
96
See e.g., Collaborative Defense for Your Legal Malpractice Claims, ATT’Y PROTECTIVE,
https://www.attorneyprotective.com/legal-malpractice-claims [https://perma.cc/8KG9-NUCH]
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (providing an example of innovative products in the legal
malpractice insurance sector).
97
See JORDI MONTALBO & DAVID RUSH, DELOITTE LLP, A DEMANDING FUTURE: THE FOUR
TRENDS THAT DEFINE INSURANCE IN 2020, at 3–4 (2019), www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
94
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be to emphasize policyholders’ needs, preferences, and perceptions in nearly
all aspects of their business and at every touchpoint throughout the
customer’s journey. The customer experience must be hyper-personalized
because buyers of insurance—especially sophisticated, commercial buyers
such as law firms—have never been more informed, more adept at
comparative shopping, and more exacting. As we discuss below, hyperpersonalization is now a customer prerequisite to be achieved through
detailed data analysis, innovation, and modern digital capabilities.
As ironic as it may seem, the legal industry, which itself has been
slow to change, is likely to drive the change in LPL underwriting metrics.
The same pressure that law firms are feeling from their clients will
undoubtedly funnel down to LPL insurers, who will feel change pressures
from their own law firm clients. Clients are strongly pushing back on law
firms with respect to their legal fees. Those legal fees have, in turn, been
embedded within LPL coverage and rate cost structure. With the clients of
law firms monitoring fees more closely, it is reasonable to expect law firms
also to be more cost-conscious when it comes to the fixed cost associated
with LPL premiums. If a law firm can urge an LPL carrier to use a more
accurate and hyper-personalized set of underwriting metrics to lessen the
malpractice risk profile and thus reduce premiums, it does not take a severe
strain of logic to conclude that law firms will eventually do just that. 98
Financial transparency and clarity have been the rallying cry in the
legal industry for several decades now. Its value holds true in the LPL
industry as well. LPL underwriting guidelines and the weighting of the
factors varies widely from carrier to carrier. Often, the underwriting
guidelines are not published, and law firms have no way of truly
understanding those guidelines.99 Understandably, LPL insurers must set the
price of premiums at a level that compensates them for the risk taken, but also
at a level that fits within the budget of their law firm customer. Otherwise,
the law firm will go elsewhere for coverage. Law firms surely deserve better
guidance and information on how their risk profile is calculated, how they
can reduce their malpractice risk profile, and how they can use enhanced selfgovernance to improve their LPL risk profile. When malpractice
underwriting guidelines are a black box, risky law firms get lumped in with

Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-insurance-trends-2019.pdf [https://perma.
cc/55JH-YM9X] (describing why customers are the most disruptive force in the insurance
business).
98
Especially if the result is more money in partners’ pockets because of the savings on LPL
insurance premiums, because of fewer claim payouts, and because of improving the risk
factors overall.
99
See supra note 60 (“Almost universally, the LPL industry experts shared the view that
their lawyer-insureds have only a superficial understanding of the LPL evaluation process.”).
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less-risky law firms, creating a tremendous amount of premium disparity. The
less risky law firms are subsidizing the behavior of their riskier counterparts.
But how much data will law firms be willing to give their insurers?
After all, bad drivers probably don’t want the “mole on the console” 100
exposing their lead feet, their tailgating, or their other bad habits to insurers
because their rates will go up. Law firms probably don’t want their bad habits
laid bare to LPL insurers, either. But the risks don’t go away just because
LPL insurers don’t know about them. And those risks are expensive.
Reducing the risk of malpractice can save law firms big bucks in the ordinary
course of business, but especially when a law firm is in a transformative mode
where, for instance, it is looking to grow attorney headcount, expand into new
practice areas or geographies, or pursue the next “tier” of clients.101 In this
regard, consider a law firm with a strategic growth initiative through lateral
partner acquisitions. For that firm, it would be highly beneficial to know in
advance how risky the addition of lateral lawyers will be for the firm. 102 The
epic bankruptcy case of Dewey & LeBeouf demonstrated the risk of adding
laterals whose promises were mere fantasies. 103 And then, of course, there are
the advantages to the clients.
As law firms are being pressured by clients to use technology and data
to make the delivery of legal service better, faster, and cheaper, the firms are
responding by leveraging their knowledge management repositories,
document management systems, and billing data warehouses to deliver
service offerings (and even product offerings) that involve mass
customization and incorporate their clients’ demands for efficiency and
innovation.104 So, too, will law firms demand this heightened standard from
providers of LPL coverage. The trickle-down effect will come into play.
When a law firm is uninsured, underinsured, or overcharged because
premiums are not based on hyper-personalized malpractice risk factors, then

100

Stenquist, supra note 35.
In just those cases that the two of us have reviewed, we’ve seen exposure in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars per firm. That’s not chump change.
102
Some firms are making data-driven choices in terms of adding laterals. In particular,
Duane Morris has a process for gathering information about a lateral partner’s book of
business and has a deliberate onboarding plan to integrate lateral partners into the culture of the
firm. HEIDI K. GARDNER & ANNELENA LOBB, Collaborating for Growth: Duane Morris in a
Turbulent Legal Sector, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE STUD. 9-414-022, at 12–13 (July 26, 2013).
103
For a great read on the Dewey & LeBeouf debacle, see James B. Stewart, The Collapse,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 7, 2013).
104
See Caryn Devens, Teppo Felin, Stuart Kauffman & Roger Koppl, The Law and Big Data,
27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 357, 366 (2017) (describing new client services and tools
enabled by the use of big data, including tools that “predict legal costs and case outcomes,
manage data for regulatory compliance, and reduce document review costs”).
101
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the law firm’s clients suffer. 105 Legal malpractice simply doesn’t stop at the
law firm level. Real money and the real lives of clients and other third parties
are at stake when legitimate malpractice claims arise. LPL insurers and law
firms must acknowledge the reality that their financial interests depend on
clients who buy legal services. Thus, it is imperative to bring LPL
underwriting into the twenty-first century. The next Part discusses the new
data-driven, behavior-driven playbook on how to modernize LPL
underwriting metrics.
IV. A NEW DATA-DRIVEN SCHEMA
Iris: The Pre-Cogs are never wrong. But,
occasionally . . . they do disagree.
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)106
The auto insurance paradigm affirms that powerful new data analytics
technologies and novel uses of existing technologies enable insurers to
leverage raw data in ways never before imaginable. Auto insurers use a
driver’s media system not just as road trip entertainment and the driver’s GPS
system not just as a map but also as a means to capture and extrapolate driver
behavior, revolutionizing underwriting risk for every driver seeking auto
insurance. Auto insurers have realized that raw data captured from disparate
information sources and a multitude of technologies can be synthesized and
transformed into meaningful behavioral data, which in turn can highlight
predictive trends upon which new underwriting metrics can be built. For the
auto insurance industry, the keys to success have involved recognizing the
existence of the raw data and having the creative vision to repurpose
technologies to surface behavioral trends and supplement demographic data.
Every LPL industry expert that we interviewed craved additional data,
particularly behavioral data, that could amplify the current criteria used in the
LPL underwriting process.107 For the LPL insurance industry, the keys to
success likewise involve leveraging next-generation technology to transform
raw data into hyper-personalized, behavioral underwriting metrics. This
section discusses the raw data sources and how that raw data can transform
the LPL underwriting process.

105

For a cash-based business like a law firm, an inflated premium or an underinsured claim
can have serious ramifications for the financial performance of the law firm. With more
accurate underwriting metrics come greater fiscal predictability and better operational results
for law firms.
106
MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
107
Information gathered from author interviews. See supra note 10.
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A. The Raw Data
In order to form a good foundation for a next-generation legal
malpractice underwriting metric, raw data must have three vital qualities: (i)
raw data should have independent usefulness and validity, 108 (ii) raw data
should be accessible at scale, 109 and (iii) raw data should be capable of
personalization or individualization. Legal billing data fit all of these qualities
and form much of the foundation for our proposed LPL underwriting schema.
Each year in the United States alone, lawyers bill clients over $300
110
billion. Until the early 1990s, when timekeeping and billing software
became commonplace, law firms sent invoices to clients in paper format. 111
Whether in paper form or submitted through a digital platform, legal invoices
are rich with raw, semi-structured data. In each invoice, a lawyer reflects, in
a narrative entry, every task that he or she completes, typically in segments
of one-tenth of an hour. For anyone who hasn’t had the misfortune of reading
a legal invoice, here’s a sample time entry:
Date

Timekeeper

Hours Rate

6/9/2020

E. Afferton

2.3

$520

Description
Total
Analyze US 9,949,302 re: patent
eligibility (0.4); Draft “Legal
Analysis” part of Section 101 Alice
Motion (1.6); Review curriculum
vitae re: plaintiff's expert (0.3)
$1,196.00

This is an example of a “good” invoice line item entry. It is clear,
concise, (presumably) reflects accurately recorded time, and amply informs
the client as to what tasks were undertaken and by whom, along with the
associated cost. Sometimes, line-item narrative descriptions contain much
more detail, which can be good until they become so wordy that they
obfuscate what work has actually been performed.112 Other line-item
narrative descriptions may contain considerably less detail (e.g., “attention to
file”), to the point that it is impossible to determine what task the attorney
108

We think that independent usefulness and validity is important because these factors
negate the possibility of bias in the data and further helps to ensure accuracy.
109
We believe that there is a tipping point where raw data is sufficiently voluminous to
provide statistical relevance and scientific value. In an industry that generates at least $300
billion in annual invoice data, volume and accessibility at scale pose no issue.
110
Industry Revenue of Legal Services in the U.S. from 2011 to 2023, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/forecasts/311177/legal-services-revenue-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/
ZF4U-YD4B] (last visited June 17, 2020).
111
Stephen J. Sturgill, New System Offers Easier and More Exact Billing, NATIONAL L.J.,
October 17, 1994, at 13. Currently, we estimate that over $300 billion in legal billing data is
processed by law firm time and billing platforms and/or clients’ e-billing platforms.
112
See infra Section IV.B.2 and Section IV.B.3.
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performed. Regardless of the clarity and quality of the narrative, every
invoice line item offers data points that shine a light on what the lawyers and
other billing professionals are doing. Those data also form the foundation of
a legal professional’s behavioral patterns.113
The sample invoice line item entry reflects a total charge of $1,196
for three items of work performed by E. Afferton, all of which total 2.3 hours.
This is just a single invoiced time entry for a single client by a single law firm
timekeeper for, possibly, one-fourth of one timekeeper’s workday.114 These
data points scale quickly. Right now, there are probably more than 950,000
attorneys in private practice in the United States 115 who are recording and
billing time in a similar manner in approximately 1,300,000,000 to
1,500,000,000 line-item entries that can be analyzed every year. 116 Most of
these data can be easily accessed, because timesheets “live” in digital format
on billing and e-billing platforms.
This invoice line-item data, which is inherently timekeeper-specific,
is capable of even further individualization with the assistance of “legal
spend” data analytics tools. When an individual timekeeper’s professional
biographical data, such as title, seniority, specialty, educational background,
prior employers, and so forth are incorporated into an invoice line-item
analysis, the results are hyper-personalized and powerful.
In essence, invoice line-item data, coupled with a timekeeper’s
professional biographical data, is transformed into something akin to the
DNA of a matter or a legal professional. Out of this invoice-level DNA,
hyper-personalized behavioral data can become a next-generation LPL
113

As we discuss below in Section IV.B.3, a vague, cryptically written narrative entry, such
as “Analyze outstanding issues,” “Attention to case strategy and client communications,” or
“Review file,” informs our proposed LPL underwriting schema because while it sheds no
light on what a legal professional did, it evidences a potential tendency for sloppy billing
hygiene practices or even possible Rule 1.5 violations.
114
At some law firms, 2.3 hours is perhaps 1/6 of a person’s workday.
115
See Sally Kane, Working in a Private Practice Law Firm, BALANCE CAREERS (Jan. 12,
2019) https://www.thebalancecareers.com/law-firm-life-2164667 [https://perma.cc/N3PDP73P] (“About 75 percent of the 1.3 million-plus licensed attorneys in the U.S. work in
private practice. Lawyers are considered to work in private practice when they’re part of a
firm with two or more attorneys, or they have a solo practice.”).
116
Let’s extrapolate upon this type of invoice line item to understand the potential and power
of raw billing data, even before it gets programmatically transformed into LPL malpractice
risk factors. There are several ways to extrapolate. First, let’s calculate based on an “hours
worked” basis. Based on our industry statistics, the average hours worked per line-item entry
is 1.1 hours. Assuming an annual 1,800 billable target, each of the 950,000 attorneys in
private practice will record 1,636 time entries for a total of over 1,500,000,000 narrative
entries just for the year 2020. If we assume that $300 billion was billed by law firms on an
hourly basis using line-item invoices where the average value per line item is $225, then
there are over 1,300,000,000 narrative entries that can be analyzed every year. Calculations
on industry averages were made using Legal Decoder’s data pool.
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underwriting metric that examines risk not just by firm size or practice area
but also by the type of lawsuit or specific transaction, calculates risk with
respect to an individual or to groups of individuals within a law firm, and ties
the risk to behavioral patterns.
B. Using Legal Analytics to Calculate Risk: The Six Malpractice Markers
Just as automobile insurers are using behavioral data to supplement
demographic data, LPL underwriting will benefit by using, as part of its
underwriting evaluation, our proposed analytic framework, which generates
behavioral data from legal spend data. We’re basing our proposed
framework on our own experience, having reviewed millions of line-item
entries in legal invoices from thousands of law firms and hundreds of
thousands of legal professionals.
Although we know that every client matter is different, as are the
invoices attached to each matter, we can mine a law firm’s billing records for
patterns of good or bad practices. Our analytic framework is meant to
augment and amplify existing LPL underwriting standards, not to displace
them. Indeed, there’s no need for a wholesale change in business process or
methods. The new behavioral metrics, which we’ll call “malpractice markers,”
are simply an evolutionary step forward. We understand that this step is a giant
step, not a baby step, but it’s a necessary step. So, in a “pre-cog” world, what
does our proposed analytic framework look like? How can insurers mine and
categorize timesheet entries for predictive risk analysis, to help both the
malpractice insurers and their insureds identify serious malpractice concerns
before those concerns mature into full-blown problems?
We’ve identified the six major malpractice markers, in addition to
some minor ones, that could help catch potential malpractice before it
happens. Our proposed analytics framework employs a weighting
methodology similar to that used by LPL insurers in their existing
demographic risk factors.
1. Staffing efficiency
Malpractice risk increases when the wrong staffing is used on a project.
In an optimally functioning legal environment, a legal professional handles
tasks appropriate for his or her skill set in an industry-benchmarked amount of
time. There are many dimensions to the concept of staffing efficiency.117

As a strategic priority, clients are identifying those tasks that are “commoditizable” in
order to divert low-value, high-volume work from law firms to lower-cost alternative legal
services providers.
117
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One dimension relates to the seniority of a legal professional. We’ve
encountered many situations in which the wrong level of professional
performed a task: for example, senior partners performing tasks below their
paygrade such as basic legal research 118 or the converse, where very junior
lawyers, without ample supervision, are handling tasks for which they are
underqualified, such as taking a key 30(b)(6) deposition or negotiating the
contract language on a complicated tax indemnity provision.119 In the case of the
senior partner’s research, it raises valid questions: What senior-level work has
been cast aside in favor of the basic research? If a senior partner handles basic
research below her paygrade, does that work comport with the Rule 1.5 ethical
obligation regarding reasonable fees?120 For the junior associate, the lack of
experience on a sophisticated task clearly implicates the junior lawyer’s (and her
law firm’s) duty to provide competent representation.121
We suspect that one of the problems with staffing inefficiency is that
the partner in charge of a particular representation isn’t monitoring, in real
time, the cost of who’s doing which tasks. That partner is aware of the
assignments of various professionals to tasks that must be completed, but
likely isn’t aware—at least not until the time comes to review the bill—of
how much time each professional spent on each task. Another dimension of
staffing efficiency relates to a lawyer dabbling outside of her primary area of
practice. In almost every imaginable instance, an intellectual property
attorney should not be handling a living trust document for a high net-worth
client, and a trusts and estates attorney should not be handling a trademark
for a start-up technology client. Invoice data, when evaluated with
sophisticated legal data analytics tools, very quickly surfaces trends where
attorneys are practicing at the wrong skill set level or in the wrong area of
law. Both are red flags for LPL risk purposes
And the explanations tend to range from “I needed it immediately, and there was no one else
around” to “I can do it faster.” We absolutely believe that senior partners can do complicated legal
research faster, but simple research belongs in a junior professional’s wheelhouse.
119
The failure to assign the right level of work to the right level of lawyer implicates various
ethics rules, and law firms should have systems for ensuring that the right work goes to the
right people. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. RESPONSIBILITY r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(describing the obligations that lawyers who supervise or give orders to other lawyers have
to ensure that they are conforming to ethical rules, including rules of competence and
diligence in legal work); see also id. r. 5.2 (stating that lawyers are bound even if they are
acting at the direction of another, but that they may rely on supervisory lawyers’ reasonable
interpretations of professional responsibility); id. r. 5.3 (outlining lawyers’ duties to ensure
that “nonlawyer[s]” are acting ethically and not impeding on lawyers’ ethical obligations).
120
See id. r. 1.5 (requiring that fees be reasonable with respect to “the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services” and “the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly,” among other factors).
121
See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 2, cmt. 4 (detailing the basic obligations of competence and noting that “[a]
newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience” but that
lawyers should only take matters where competence is obtainable “by reasonable preparation”).
118
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2. Workflow efficiency
When clients pay their lawyers by the hour, they expect their lawyers
to work efficiently without wasted effort, unneeded redundancy in personnel,
or duplication of work. Inefficiencies in a lawyer’s workflow process quickly
drive up the cost of legal services. Few things can sour the attorney-client
relationship as deeply as when a client opens an invoice and sees a legal
professional doing the same work over and over again (without increased
efficiency), or multiple lawyers at the same level handling the same task at
the same time, or throngs of legal professionals attending meetings or
hearings. Invoices containing these types of inefficiencies leave the client
questioning outside counsel’s competence and her fiduciary duty of candor,
and the client starts worrying about whether the professional provided real
value for each hour billed.
Although one might think that having multiple tiers of professionals
working on a task would increase the odds for competent, 122 diligent123
representation, that’s not necessarily true. Having that many bodies requires
massive coordination in order to avoid problems with client
communication124 and unreasonably high fees.125 More is not always better,
and too many professionals assigned to a single workflow matter can create
confusion and duplication of effort, as different layers of lawyers change
documents to their preferred individual styles as a draft moves through the
process.126 As we have said before, in order to dissipate the fear of accidental
malpractice, lawyers will justify bringing many people to a hearing or a
meeting, instead of a few. After all, a diversity of experience will best serve
the client, and having top-notch knowledge on hand will provide better
service than having to wait for someone back at the office to provide an
answer to a particular question. Lawyers who work their way up the law firm
ladder often have very specialized expertise, so having both Partner A (with
expertise in one area of tax law) and Partner B (with a different expertise in
tax law) in a meeting will catch any errors and help to come up with a better
work product. For lawyers who are still working their way through the
associate ranks, someone more senior must supervise their work. Junior
Associate X’s research will get supervised by mid-level Associate Y, who
will do the first draft of a document, only to have senior Associate Z revise
122

Id. r. 1.1.
Id. r. 1.3.
124
See id. r. 1.4 (describing obligations to keep clients apprised of the status of their legal
matters, including information necessary to facilitate informed consent and decision-making).
125
See id. r. 1.5 (noting that reasonable fees consider “the time and labor required” as well
as “[t]he scope of representation” previously communicated to the client).
126
As an example, one of us worked with a partner who eschewed middle initials on
pleadings and spent time editing out those offending initials.
123

300

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2020

the document before handing it to a partner for final revisions. One lawyer in
an office will pop into another lawyer’s office to get some advice on a matter,
and those pop-in meetings can span large blocks of time as the professionals
spitball ideas. “Even filing a pleading that simply states that one party agrees
with some other party’s position can result in significant billed time if more
than one professional has to set eyes on the draft before it gets filed.”127
Ironically, those multiple layers of review ultimately can raise the
specter of malpractice. After all, it is more efficient to put all of the main
professionals in a room for a half hour, at the beginning of a representation,
to communicate what’s going on and who will handle which issues than it is
to have separate conversations with each professional, and it is more efficient
to update a workgroup by quick emails (and be allowed to bill for the time
drafting and reading those emails) than it is to have a series of cascading
meetings or phone calls. But it is not particularly efficient to schedule allhands weekly meetings in which people who don’t need to be at the meeting
show up because it was too much trouble to cull the invite list. As these
workflow inefficiencies snowball and intensify, a client’s initial dismay
becomes frustration; frustration then becomes anger; and anger can quickly
transform into a malpractice claim.
All of the activities suggesting workflow inefficiencies (internal
office conferences, multi-attorney meetings, repeated tasks, and so on) have
been memorialized in invoice line-item data. When we analyze tens (or
hundreds) of thousands of line items recorded by a timekeeper or massive
volumes of line items from innumerable timekeepers, we can surface
behavioral patterns of workflow inefficiencies. Once surfaced, workflow
inefficiency trends can be correlated to malpractice risk.
3. Billing hygiene
We define exemplary billing hygiene as “recording clear, concise,
informative narrative entries linked to the time to complete an individual
task.”128 The goal of billing hygiene is to explain who did what and for how
long, so that those paying hourly-rate bills understand the components of the
legal fees.129 Billing hygiene problems come in a wide variety of flavors,
127

Rapoport & Tiano, Jr., Legal Analytics, supra note 3, at 1276.
Id. at 1293. And, as we said in that article, “[t]he time entry ‘Attention to file—2.1 hours’
is unhelpful today and even less helpful tomorrow when trying to price legal services with
certainty.” Id.; see also Nancy B. Rapoport, ‘‘Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using
Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL
MAL. & ETHICS 42, 86 (2014) (“‘[A]ttention to file’ has never told a single client what the
biller actually did . . . .”).
129
We’re actually fans of alternative billing methods, and legal analytics can help lawyers
price fees that are based on metrics other than time multiplied by hourly rate.
128
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ranging from vague, cryptically written narrative entries to overly verbose
narrative entries that obfuscate any inkling of the work performed. “Blockbilling” is the practice of lumping together many tasks spanning several hours
into a single narrative description. “Round-hour” billing is where a
statistically improbable number of time entries end in a zero (1.0, 2.0, 3.0,
etc.). Both block-billing and round-hour billing can eventually trigger a
client’s ire, which may lead to full-blown malpractice lawsuits. Admittedly,
there are many reasons that lawyers might not write clear time entries. For
the types of work for which bills are part of the public record, 130 lawyers
might not want to signal their strategy.131 Moreover, lawyers who don’t
record their time contemporaneously might not remember in detail what they
did.132 Those lawyers who are on our side of the bifocal divide might not have
been trained to provide clear time entries.133
When billing hygiene is poor, malpractice risk is high. First, poor
billing hygiene is an indication that a firm’s lawyer and paraprofessional
training program and its administrative controls are weak. Second, poor
billing hygiene, even when it results from sloppiness or laziness rather than
from maliciousness, runs afoul of a lawyer’s Rule 1.5 obligation regarding
reasonableness of fees and the Rule 8.4(c) obligation not to lie.134 Finally,
poor billing hygiene will irritate even the most patient and cooperative client,
and if the lawyer-client relationship deteriorates, poor billing hygiene can
form the basis for allegations of billing fraud.
4. Institutional governance
Having gotten into the habit of chronicling their workdays in onetenth of an hour segments of billable time, most legal professionals also
account for their non-billable time in a similar manner. Typical categories of
non-billable activities include pro bono work, business development, firm
management committees, attorney mentorship, client billing, and continuing

130

Such as fee applications in chapter 11 cases.
See, e.g., Rapoport, supra note 8, at 47, n.33 (2020) (providing sources that describe what
happened when two law firms—Kirkland & Ellis and Jones Day—scrutinized each other’s
timesheets as part of a larger skirmish).
132
We think that making up the entries later violates MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5
(Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (regarding fees), r. 1.4 (regarding communications), r. 5.1 (regarding
supervisory lawyer responsibilities), and r. 8.4(c) (prohibiting “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”), not to mention the overarching fiduciary
duty to the client.
133
Being on our side of the bifocal divide may explain that behavior, but it doesn’t excuse it.
134
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 1.5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (providing that a lawyer
“shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount”); r. 8.4 (noting that dishonesty and deceit constitute professional misconduct).
131
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legal education.135 Insofar as legal professionals capture their tasks and
activities within these categories of non-billable work, we think that such
organizational governance/non-billable data can have a major effect on
malpractice risk.
If a partner with a $1,500,000 book of business spends fewer than 30
minutes per month on billing activities, it calls into question whether the
partner is adequately reviewing the invoices that he or she is sending to
clients, again bucking up against the ethics rule on the reasonableness of
fees.136 If an inconsequential amount of non-billable time is recorded to firm
management committees, which are established to streamline processes and
mitigate risks, that signals inattention to risk mitigation procedures that can
reduce malpractice risk. Conversely, where attorneys’ timekeeping records
indicate that they’ve taught or attended more than the required amount of
continuing legal education programs, that might bode well for lowering
malpractice risk.137 Just as with the other malpractice markers, even nonbillable activities can be relevant to LPL underwriting risk.138
5. Matter oversight
Any lawyer charged with overseeing a matter should meet the
standard of care requiring her to use and manage “people, processes, and
technology” effectively and efficiently. When an attorney who is the “lead”

Most larger law firms set up a “dummy” client/matter account where the client is reflected
as “non-billable time” and a matter is reflected as “pro bono,” or “management committee
work” or “CLE.” Contrary to popular opinion, law firms do care what their legal
professionals are doing when they are not handling billable work.
136
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 1.5 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (discussing reasonableness
of fees).
137
This assumes the attorneys actually pay attention during the CLEs, rather than just
multitasking. Sitting in a room playing on one’s smart phone isn’t the same thing as listening
to the presentation.
138
Staffing efficiency, workflow efficiency, billing hygiene, and organizational governance
are certainly our four candidates for the most likely predictors of potential malpractice
problems, but presumably there are several others as well. For example, we might be able to
catch those types of behaviors that are typically associated with competency and diligence
risks by paying attention to how upcoming deadlines get docketed on a lawyer’s calendar. If
a paralegal dockets an upcoming filing deadline for, say, a summary judgment motion, then
there should be concomitant calendar entries for starting the drafting process and assembling
all of the necessary components. If a paralegal dockets an upcoming motion with a filing
deadline of December 1, and nothing happens on the drafting side until perhaps a few days
before December 1, then the odds of a well-written, well-argued motion go way down. We
can conceive of an internal system that nags lawyers to start the drafting process earlier.
Perhaps a poorly drafted motion won’t rise to the level of malpractice, but why not reduce
the risk by advance (and automated) planning?
135
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attorney on a matter falls short of the mark on her matter-oversight
responsibilities, that failure poses a malpractice risk.
In terms of the people component, a properly managed matter should
be staffed with an appropriate number of legal professionals with the right
mix of seniority and skill sets, as dictated by the scope and complexity of a
matter. Understaffing a matter with too few legal professionals can be as
problematic as overstaffing it. Likewise, staffing a matter with too few senior
attorneys and too many junior legal professionals can pose a competence
issue. Using too many “drive-by” billers who breeze in and out of the matter
and who are not fully committed to it can foster ineffective communication,
failed accountability, and a shallow understanding of the legal and factual
issues of the matter. Managing people, particularly legal professionals, is tricky
for the attorney leading the matter. She must deftly use different people’s skills
at the right time and in the right manner and scope, all while ensuring effective
team communications with minimal waste and redundancy. At bottom, poor
personnel management increases malpractice risk.
Designing and managing a well-thought-through process is equally
important when it comes to matter oversight. Without a good process, things
simply can fall through the cracks. For example, a faulty process will cause
professionals to miss deadlines or do sloppy, rushed work.
In the current tech-enabled world, the effective use of technology in
a matter is critical to good matter oversight. In fact, 38 state bar associations
have indicated that part of a lawyer’s duty of competence includes a duty of
technological competence. 139 Lead attorneys on a matter need know to how
and when to use case management technologies, virtual data rooms,
eDiscovery tools, and legal research platforms. No longer is technological
competence a role solely for the information technology (IT) department,
knowledge management experts, or librarians. These tech skills must be
arrows in the lead attorney’s quiver. If a lead attorney can’t draw back the
bow, or the arrows consistently fly wide of the mark, these shortcomings can
materialize into a significant malpractice risk.
When invoice data for a particular matter is reconstructed using
advanced legal spend data analytics tools, it is tantamount to the genetic
roadmap for that matter: people, process and technology can be examined in
a multi-dimensional analysis. It is possible to identify appropriate
partner/associate leverage ratios, transient timekeepers, matter advancement,
See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added) (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and
risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and
comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”);
see also Tech Competence, LAWSITES https://www.lawsitesblog.com/tech-competence
[https://perma.cc/TW99-QUQE] (last visited Nov. 23, 2020) (depicting the states that
recognize a lawyer’s duty to maintain technological competence).
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task allocations and flow, communications patterns, and technology usage.
It’s then easy to compare those metrics on a single matter against comparable
matters on an industry-wide basis to establish the relevant standard of care
and related matter oversight markers.
6. Fiduciary risk
Every lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to her client. 140 At all times, a
lawyer must use her professional skills and energy to act in her client’s best
interest and to disclose any interest—economic or otherwise—that could
conflict with her client’s interest. Lawyers must adhere to the duty of loyalty,
the duty of confidentiality, the duty of competence, and the duty to
communicate. A proven breach of any of these duties will likely trigger
malpractice liability.
As we’ve studied invoice data across multiple cases, we’ve
discovered that the “fiduciary risk” malpractice marker requires an evaluation
of not just what happened based on invoice data, but also what didn’t happen.
An analysis of a lawyer’s non-billable time entry data could surface times
when she engages in activities that are harbingers of malpractice, such as
interactions with her law firm’s risk management partner(s) or state bar
officials; legal research on ethics issues; or communications putting a carrier
on notice. In theory, some of these activities will evidence a fiduciary duty
breach. The absence of certain categories of activities in invoice data, such
as a paucity of attorney/client communications, will also raise legitimate
questions on whether a lawyer is discharging her fiduciary duties properly.
C. Creating the LPL Malpractice Risk Score
Rufus Riley: [to Agatha] Are you reading my
mind right now?
John Anderton: Get up.

Some lines of jurisprudence surrounding a lawyer’s fiduciary duty include only the duty
of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality as comprising a lawyer’s fiduciary duty whereas
other lines also include the duty of competence and duty to communicate. See, e.g., Bank of
Hartford, Inc. v. Bultron, NO. SP-H-9296-65684, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3551, at *20–
21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1992) (describing the duties of an attorney as “competence,
loyalty, confidentiality and communication”). We acknowledge that aspects of our Fiduciary
Risk marker could be viewed as overlapping with aspects of the other five markers, much
like a breach of fiduciary duty action can overlap with actions under other theories of
liability. The duty of competence and duty to communicate are subsumed by another
malpractice marker. Accordingly, the “Fiduciary Risk” marker centers on the duty of loyalty
and duty of confidentiality.
140
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Rufus Riley: [to Agatha] I’m sorry for
whatever I’m going to do and I swear I didn’t
do any of that stuff that I did.
— MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002)141
We know that there is a sufficient quantum of valuable data that can
be analyzed to show legal professional behavioral patterns. We also know
that there are legal data analytics tools that can analyze and categorize the
legal spend data in a manner that surfaces behavioral trends. No longer are
LPL actuaries relegated to generalizations, inferences, and conjecture when
it comes to behavioral data. Behavioral data can allow lawyers and their LPL
insurers to forecast, in a pre-cog-like manner, malpractice.
Out of the complex stew of LPL application data, LPL claims data,
invoice data, biographical data, and LPL actuarial analyses, we think that
there should emerge an LPL malpractice behavioral scoring metric. Today’s
technology easily can analyze and synthesize terabytes (or even petabytes or
exabytes) of complex data and transform the data into a lawyer-by-lawyer,
simple, individualized/hyper-personalized LPL Malpractice Risk Score, akin
to an A.M. Best rating, FICO score, Moody’s rating, or similar industryaccepted standard.
With advanced data analytics tools, legal invoice data can be analyzed
on a line-item-by-line-item basis. When a line item contains one or more data
points that tie to one or more of the six malpractice markers, that line item
can be flagged and assigned to a malpractice marker category. When this
flagging and assignment exercise is done at scale, evidence of LPL behavioral
risk naturally follows. The law firm, or the attorney herself, or both could
monitor the Malpractice Risk Score over time, with the hope of improvement,
in the same way that people now monitor their credit scores. Moreover, the
Malpractice Risk Score could be combined with the existing demographic
data to amplify existing LPL underwriting guidelines: The Malpractice Risk
Score could be compared against peers; the score could even be rolled up
with data from other professionals in the same firm to provide an overall firm
score. Simply put, the Malpractice Risk Score, which transforms an attorney’s
own time entries into behavioral data, brings twenty-first century big-data
insights to legacy LPL underwriting metrics that came from the late 1900s.142
141

MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002).
Our intrepid research assistant, Joshua Nelson, asked us an important question while he
was helping us with this article: Wouldn’t law firms, knowing what comprised the
Malpractice Risk Score, game the system to keep their perceived risk down? That’s
absolutely a possibility: After all, law schools game the U.S. NEWS rankings all the time.
See, e.g., Darren Bush & Jessica Peterson, Jukin’ the Stats: The Gaming of Law School
142
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CONCLUSION
The legal industry and the insurance industry, particularly the LPL
Insurance segment, can experience a renaissance by using behavioral data
and our Malpractice Risk Score. Real malpractice risk can be individualized
so that the less risky insureds don’t wind up subsidizing their higher-risk
counterparts. LPL insurers can develop new coverage options that protect
more lawyers (and more risks) at a more affordable price, and those insurers
could predict malpractice risk with greater accuracy. Most important,
catching potential risk early allows a professional to find ways to reduce that
risk, thereby reducing the likelihood and severity of actual malpractice
claims. Risk prevention measures can be tailored to the risky behaviors of
individual legal professionals. Underwriting costs and claim exposure and
severity should decrease, in part because aggrieved clients will be able to
point to concrete metrics to support their legitimate claims and in part because
professionals with good systems and habits in place should be able to
leverage the metrics to avoid or refute frivolous malpractice claims. Much

Rankings and How to Stop It, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2013) (discussing pressure on
law schools to “juke the stats” to gain a competitive advantage); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Managing U.S. News & World Report—The Enron Way, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 423, 423 n.1
(2013) (providing examples of data misrepresentation and manipulation at Illinois Law,
Villanova, and the University of St. Thomas); Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/us/education/the-878million-maneuver.html [https://perma.cc/8CUG-ZC9N] (describing the odd incentives and
choices posed to law schools as a result of the importance of U.S. News & World Report
rankings). We’re of two minds about Josh’s question: We think that some of the gaming that
goes on is wasteful (for example, the glossy brochures that law schools mail—or used to
mail, at least—touting how great they are in time for the voting for U.S. News’s reputational
scores). These brochures are known colloquially as “law porn.” See, e.g., Doug Litowitz,
Law Porn and its Discontents, 6 CRIT: CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 14, 15 (2012) (“‘Law porn’
is an epithet that refers to professional-looking, glossy publications commissioned by law
schools . . . often attributed to attempts by law school administrators to influence the U.S.
News & World Report annual ranking of law schools.”). We can also point to the almost
fanatical scrutiny of LSATs and undergraduate GPAs that law schools use to manipulate the
25th and 75th percentiles of those two factors. But we also think that the reason that many
law schools game the rankings relates to how little the rankings reflect actual differences
among law schools. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News &
World Report Shouldn’t Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The New Yorker,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1099 (1999) (describing portions of the U.S. News ranking system as a
“dartboard” approach or as a “glorified coin toss at best”); see also id. at 1101 & 1101 n.17
(suggesting that U.S. News could also rank law schools by faculty height—or inverse height—
but that ranking wouldn’t reflect quality, either). If we’re right that the Malpractice Risk Score
reflects actual risk, then the gaming actually lowers risk, which is a good thing. If we’re wrong,
though, then we’d need to titrate the score until it more accurately reflects risk.
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like their counterparts in the auto insurance lines, behavioral data promises
to be the next-generation differentiator for LPL insurers. LPL insurers that
leverage behavioral data will flourish; those that fail to leverage behavior data
will do so at their peril.

